1 edition of Interjurisdictional competition in the federal system found in the catalog.
Interjurisdictional competition in the federal system
by Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in [Washington, DC]
Written in English
|Contributions||United States. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||viii, 24 p. ;|
|Number of Pages||24|
For the same purposes, our government is organized through institutional competition among the three federal branches and among the federal and state governments. The First Amendment decrees a system of intellectual laissez faire in which ideas compete for influence and acceptance. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA John Kincaid* ntergovernmental relations (i.e., federal-state-local government relations) in the United States can be described as simultaneously co-operative, conflictual, competitive, collusive, and coercive. In the realm of public administration and the daily operations of government, intergovernmental relations are .
Many commentators have credited China’s political decentralization, and the inter-jurisdictional competition it fosters, with suppressing local corruption and promoting economic growth. Other commentators have been similarly enthusiastic about the prospects for Chinese “federalism” to improve both economic and government performance, and urge China to go even further in embracing a. Merit System Principles (5 USC § ) Recruitment should be from qualified individuals from appropriate sources in an endeavor to achieve a work force from all segments of society, and selection and advancement should be determined solely on the basis of relative ability, knowledge and skills, after fair and open competition which assures that all receive equal opportunity.
The New Federalism’s focus on checks and balances above all else compromises its ability to effectively mediate this critical competition, sacrificing other federalism values and obstructing even desirable regulatory activity in the interjurisdictional gray area (such as federal initiative that might have been taken in the wake of Katrina). Value-added tax, or VAT, first introduced less than 50 years ago, is now a pivotal component of tax systems around the world. The rapid and seemingly irresistible rise of the VAT is probably the most important tax development of the latter twentieth century, and certainly the most breathtaking. Written by a team of experts from the IMF, this book examines the remarkable spread and current.
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renaissance of American medicine
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Get this from a library. Interjurisdictional competition in the federal system: a round table discussion. [United States. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.;]. Get this from a library. Interjurisdictional tax and policy competition: good or bad for the federal system?. [Daphne A Kenyon; United States.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.]. Interjurisdictional Competition in the Federal System: A Roudtable Discussion (M) Preface I.
Sincethe Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has had as its primary mission responsibility for assessing the condition of Ameri- can federalism. The ACIR Library is composed of publications that study the interactions between different levels of government. This document addresses interjurisdictional competition in the federal system Topics: Intergovernmental fiscal relations -- United States.
Interjurisdictional competition—competing for mobile bases—is a natural outcome in a U.S.-type system of fiscal federalism. MODELING INTERJURISDICTIONAL TAX COMPETITION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM Alexandre A. Porssea Eduardo A. Haddadb Eduardo P. Ribeiroc Abstract Interjurisdictional tax competition is a controversial theme with few empirical studies in spite of the great advance in the theoretical debate of the last decades.
We find that interjurisdictional tax competition reduces the global tax rate set by both overlapping governments (federal and local) but is unable to solve completely the distortion arising from vertical externalities. The model is also extended to. Interjurisdictional tax competition is a controversial theme little studied in an empirical approach in spite of the great advance in the theoretical debate at last decades.
Using a new comprehensive data set of U.S. metropolitan areas (or all metro areas for which comparable historical data were available), this article provides a newtest of the Leviathan hypothesis that there is an inverse relationship between fiscal exploitation and the amount of interjurisdictional competition.
Temple law professor Peter Spiro has an interesting New York Times column arguing that supporters of immigration should not fear a Supreme Court decision upholding Arizona’s draconian anti-illegal immigrant law, because interjurisdictional competition is likely to take care of the problem.
By contrast, he fears that if the Court strikes down the law, the result. We find that interjurisdictional tax competition reduces the global tax rate set by both overlapping governments (federal and local) but is unable to solve completely the distortion arising from vertical externalities.
The model is also extended to allow for government subsidies to industrial capital. Interjurisdictional competition with adverse selection We find that imposing a system of coarser policy instruments improves welfare relative to competition with discretionary instruments because it reduces the socially costly rents that are granted to firms in equilibrium.
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not. ‘Competition-in-laxity’ was Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns’ description of the US financial system in It is more analytically useful than the colloquial ‘race to the bottom’, as the latter implies some nonexistent extreme condition and is often meant pejoratively or as a straw-man to confute.
Then, interjurisdicional tax competition in the Brazilian federal system can be associated with gains in private consumption that overcome the reduction in regional public good provisions, reinforcing the welfare-improving equilibrium.
Economic literature: papers, articles, software, chapters, books. This article explores tensions between the underlying values of federalism that come into conflict when either the federal or State governments regulate within the interjurisdictional gray area that simultaneously implicates important local and national concerns.
Interjurisdictional Tax and Policy Competition: Good or Bad for the Federal System. (M) Author: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) Subject: Interjurisdictional Competition, Federal Government, Tax, Policy, Economic development, Grant Keywords.
Interjurisdictional competition can be defined as the competition within the government to procure some scarce beneficial resources or avoid a particular cost. The state used its authority to provide tax incentives as well as economic development incentives to entice and retain economic development in their jurisdictions.
In the United States, interjurisdictional competition has played a significant role in shaping corporation law.
The incentive for states to compete for corporate charters is purely financial, since states earn incorporation fees and franchise taxes when companies. Academic literature in public finance has focused on interjurisdictional tax competition—namely among similar types of local governments—but has leaved vertical externalities arising from interactions between two overlapping governments sharing the same tax base aside.
The results suggest that interjurisdictional tax competition is a race-to-the-bottom but this outcome is welfare-improving at the Nash equilibrium. Also is observed that the vertical linkages of the Brazilian fiscal federalism play an important role on the welfare effects of interjurisdictional tax competition.
Academic literature in public finance has focused on interjurisdictional tax competition—namely among similar types of local governments—but has leaved vertical externalities arising from.
Federal states appear less effe ctive at providing interjurisdictional competition is a majo r source of discipline on subnational governments worldwide: in fact, countries with smaller first-tier subnational units —and therefore lower system in which state legislatures must ratify constitutional amendments is more.mentation and reference source on the federal education system for international contacts and consultations at European level.
Furthermore, the National Dossier, being an up-to-date assessment of responsibilities, structures and developments in the German education system, addresses all interested readers in Germany and abroad.